HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: A W AY TO PAY FOR CHILDREN'S

* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis; B.A., 1985,

American University.

1 . See Peter Annin & Jerry Adler, Murder at an Early Age, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1998,

at 28, 28; John Cloud, For They Know Not What They Do? When and How Do Children Know

Right from Wrong? And How Can We Devise a Punishment to Fit Their Crimes?, TIME, Aug. 24,

1998, at 64, 64.

2 . See Annin & Adler, supra note 1, at 28.

3 . See Cloud, supra note 1, at 64.

4 . See Julie Good, Preventing Violence: From Tragedy to Solutions, U.S.A. TODAY, May

1, 1998, at 46, 47; see also Robert L. Jackson, Juvenile Arrest Rate for Violent Crimes Declines

9.2%, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, at A25 (reporting that in 1996, there were 464.7 violent crime

arrests for every 100,000 youths between 10 and 17 years old).

5 . See James Alan Fox & Glenn Pierce, American Killers Are Getting Younger, U.S.A.

TODAY, Jan. 1, 1994, at 24, 25.

6 . See Good, supra note 4, at 47. But see Jackson, supra note 4, at A25 (noting that arrests

of youths, between ages 10 and 17, declined 10.7% for murder in 1996).

7 . See Good, supra note 4, at 47 (stating that homicide arrests doubled for boys 12 years

old and younger between 1985 and 1992). But see Annin & Adler, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that

the number of children younger than 10 years old charged with murder is small and not increasing

HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: A WAY TO PAY FOR

CHILDREN’S INTENTIONAL AND

VIOLENT ACTS?

C YNTHIA A. MUSE

INTRODUCTION

It almost seems to be an everyday occurrence. A child, often a young child,

shoots another child or sets fire to a home or store. The stories from 1998 alone

stun and horrify most Americans. In Jonesboro, Arkansas, boys, ages eleven and

thirteen, fired shots in a schoolyard killing and injuring classmates and a teacher.

In Dallas, three boys, ages seven, eight, and eleven, were arrested and charged

with sexual assault of a three-year-old girl. In Chicago, a five-year-old boy was

beaten by two children, one of whom was only nine years old. The list goes on

and on.

These tragic stories are a reflection of reality. Statistics show that crimes

committed by minors are steadily increasing. Researchers at the U.S. Department

of Justice estimate that the number of juvenile crime arrests will double by the

year 2010 if population and arrest-rate-increases continue at their current pace.

Population growth is expected to continue, with the number of teenagers between

fifteen and nineteen years old growing an additional 23% by the year 2005. Just

as disturbing as the projected increase in the number of crimes committed by

minors is that the minors committing crimes are increasingly younger. Between

1985 and 1993 the number of homicides committed by fourteen- to seventeen-

year-old boys increased 165%. The number of homicide arrests for boys twelve

years and younger doubled during approximately the same time period. Also,

666 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

significantly; only 17 were charged in 1996 compared to an average of 13 charged each year in the

1980s).

8 . See Annin & Adler, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that between 1980-1996, the number of

rape arrests for children under 12 increased 250% from 222 to 553).

9. Jackson, supra note 4, at A25.

10. See John Dwight Ingram, The “Expected or Intended” Exclusion Clause in Liability

Insurance Policies: What Should It Exclude?, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 713, 713 (1992).

11. See Bilbo v. Shelter Ins. Co., 698 So. 2d 691, 694 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

12. See id.

13. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 698 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

Although a clear majority of courts in other jurisdictions infer intent when the insured

is an adult, the courts are evenly split with respect to the extension of this inference to

minors. While a slight majority of courts are willing to infer as a matter of law that a

minor insured who sexually abuses another minor does so intentionally, almost as many

jurisdictions have refused to extend the presumption of intent to minor insureds.

Id. at 276 (citations omitted); see also Fire Ins. Exch. v. Diehl, 545 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Mich. 1996);

David S. Florig, Insurance Coverage for Sexual Abuse or Molestation, 30 TORT & INS. L. J. 699,

737 (1995); Carolyn L. Mueller, Ohio Homeowners Beware: Your Homeowner’s Insurance

Premium May Be Subsidizing Child Sexual Abuse, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 341, 351-55 (1994);

rape arrests for children under twelve years of age have more than doubled.

While juvenile crime has decreased in recent years, experts warn that as the

youth population increases over the next few years, youth crime could reach

“record proportions.”

The criminal justice and juvenile court systems work to punish the minor

attacker, thereby addressing the public policy goal of deterrence. However, these

systems do not adequately address another significant public policy goal:

compensation to the victim(s) of the attack. One way to achieve victim

compensation is for the victim, or his parents, to bring a civil suit against the

attacker for his intentional act. The minor attacker, who is often an insured under

his parents’ homeowners insurance policy, then claims protection from financial

responsibility because insurance coverage is in place. In many cases, the

primary, or only, compensation for a victim’s injury is from a liability insurance

policy. However, case law is inconsistent with regard to whether homeowners

insurance policies cover intentional acts committed by minor insureds. Varying

factual situations and ambiguity in policy language have led to inconsistent and

evolving law.

Part I of this Note reviews the homeowners insurance policy: its purpose,

policy language, and applicable exclusions. Part II describes the tests used to

determine if an intentional act is covered by homeowners liability insurance.

Part III outlines recent applications of the tests to four major types of acts

committed by minors: shootings with BB guns, shootings with firearms, physical

assaults, and arson and the impact of a minor’s age on decisions of coverage.

Sexual molestation of children by other minors is not covered in this Note

because it is discussed extensively in several recent law review articles and case

decisions. This Note concludes by discussing whether coverage for intentional

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 667

Danne W. Webb, Intentional Acts and Injuries for Purposes of Insurance Coverage, 52 J. MO. B.

41, 41-42 (1996).

14. Ingram, supra note 10, at 713.

15. Id. at 714.

16. See Michael F. Aylward, Does Crime Pay? Insurance for Criminal Acts, 65 DEF.

COUNS. J. 185, 185-86 (1998).

17. Id. at 185-86 (quoting Giddings v. Industrial Indem. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1980)).

18. Id. at 186 (quoting Giddings, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 280); see also Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1297 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he words, ‘accident’ and ‘accidental’ have

never acquired any technical meaning in law, and when used in an insurance contract, they are to

be construed and considered according to common speech and common usage of people generally.”

(quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla. 1951))).

19. See Aylward, supra note 16, at 186.

20. See Western Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 701-02 (Cal. Ct. App.

1994); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 804 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Kan. 1991).

21. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 859 F. Supp. 1501, 1502 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d

1285 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stamp, 588 A.2d 363, 364 (N.H. 1991).

acts by minors has expanded in recent years and advocates excluding shootings,

assaults, and arson committed by minors from insurance coverage.

I. THE HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY

The overall purpose of a homeowners insurance policy is to “protect [an]

insured from financial loss resulting from his legal liability for injuries to []

property or person[s]” from events beyond his control. The policy is designed

to cover an insured when legal “liability result[s] from unintentional and

unexpected injuries.” To accomplish this overall purpose, policies are

generally written on an occurrence basis. An occurrence is typically defined

as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which

results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from

the standpoint of the insured.” Although the word “accident” is not usually a

defined term within the policy, courts have defined it as “occurs unexpectedly or

by chance,” or “happens without intent or through carelessness.” Thus, a

homeowners policy, through the definition of occurrence, excludes intentional

acts that result in intentional injuries or damage.

In recent years, insurance companies have also added a separate policy

exclusion reinforcing the occurrence definition. Typically, the policy exclusion

states that personal liability coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property

damage which is either expected or intended by an insured. This exclusion

applies to all insureds regardless of age. Some insurance companies vary the

exclusion language slightly. For instance, Allstate Insurance Company

sometimes includes the word “reasonably” and therefore does not cover bodily

injury that may reasonably be expected to result from intentional acts of an

insured person. The impact of adding the word “reasonably” to the policy

668 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

22. Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 470, 477 (Kan. 1983) (emphasis added).

23. See id.; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 365-66 (Neb.

1973).

24. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 207 N.W.2d 354, 355 (Minn. 1973); see also

Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Shields, 187 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Connecticut

Indem. Co. v. Nestor, 145 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).

25. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 715 (“These courts reason that making a distinction

between the legal consequences of these two terms would be inconsistent with a layman’s

reasonable expectations.”); see also Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 n.3

(Minn. 1978).

26. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 713.

27. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 804 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Kan. 1991).

28. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 720.

29. See Prosser v. Leuck, 539 N.W.2d 466, 467-68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).

30. See Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins. Co., 231 S.E.2d 701, 704 (S.C. 1977) (Littlejohn,

J., dissenting).

31. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 720 (“[W]hen an insurer is required to pay certain claims,

the burden ultimately comes to rest on the public generally, since such costs are inevitably passed

language is to require the use of an objective test, a reasonable person standard,

in determining whether the result was expected. Another modification, viewing

intentional acts from the standpoint of the insured, can change the required test

from an objective to a subjective standard. Courts interpreting the clause, “[t]his

policy does not apply . . . to bodily injury or property damage which is either

expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” look at the intent of

the insured in determining whether the intentional acts exclusion applies.

Language commonly found in insurance policies effective prior to the 1980s

excluded bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the

direction of the insured. Some courts find there is no significant difference

between the language most commonly used today and the older “caused

intentionally” language.

The policy exclusion language currently used supports numerous public

policy goals. It supports societal interests against shielding a person from the

consequences of intentional acts he or she commits. For instance, a major

consequence of an intentional act is payment to the victim. Public policy

supports making the individual responsible for the financial consequences of his

or her own intentional act. In turn, by placing financial responsibility on an

insured rather than on the insurance company, the public partially achieves its

objectives of punishing and deterring those acting against societal interests.

Other, perhaps less important, public policy goals are also met. Excluding

intentional acts from insurance coverage meets the reasonable expectations of the

contracting parties, especially where no intention or expectation was expressed.

In addition, the exclusion puts insureds on notice that an otherwise compensable

loss will not be covered if the insured intentionally commits an act that causes

injury. Finally, an intentional acts exclusion serves to keep the financial burden

from being levied against the general public.

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 669

on to the buyers of insurance and most people are insured.”).

32. See id. at 719; see also James M. Fischer, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of

Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30

SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 96-99 (1990) (discussing the reasons for the increased significance of

the intentional acts exclusion and the dominance of the compensatory goal).

33. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 719.

34. Some courts have excluded the financial risk to parents whose child has committed an

intentional act by finding separate insurance coverage for negligent supervision claims against

parents. See Aylward, supra note 16, at 190 (“In most cases, the resolution of such claims will turn

on whether operative exclusions apply to ‘the’ insured or ‘any’ insured. Where exclusions are

specifically limited to harm that was expected or intended by ‘the’ insured, courts often have found

coverage.”).

35. See Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, What a Difference a Day Makes: Age Presumptions,

Child Psychology, and the Standard of Care Required of Children, 24 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1330 (1993).

36. See Aylward, supra note 16, at 195.

On the other hand, commonly used policy language does not satisfy other

public policy goals. By denying insurance coverage for intentional acts, innocent

victims may not be compensated, especially if the insured lacks personal

financial resources. Also, the goal of spreading the risk and cost of injuries to

all insurance policyholders is not realized by excluding intentional acts from

insurance coverage.

When minors commit intentional acts, the societal goals of punishment and

deterrence through the imposition of financial consequences may have little

impact on minors’ anti-social conduct. Children rarely have the financial

resources to compensate victims. Public policy goals of reasonable and

consistent expectations between contracting parties and notice to insureds are

also less likely to be achieved. While minors are insureds, they are usually

covered under their parents’ insurance policies. Consequently, they may be

unaware of the reasonable coverage expectations between their parents, the

insurance company, and third parties. In addition, minors, because they are not

named insureds, are also not typically provided direct notice of insurance policy

language.

In addition to the compensation of victims and spread of risk goals that

support coverage for intentional acts, society also values protecting young

children from the consequences of their conduct. Hence, public policy goals

supporting coverage for minors’ intentional acts may outweigh societal interests

in excluding coverage.

II. TESTS USED TO DETERMINE IF AN INTENTIONAL ACT IS COVERED

Most of the tests used to determine if an intentional act is covered by a

homeowner’s insurance policy center on the insured’s intent. This is particularly

at issue in claims involving minors. One argument for allowing coverage is that

minors cannot understand the consequences of their actions and are not

sufficiently mature to form intent. Some courts conclusively presume that a

670 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

37. 781 P.2d 904 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).

38. See id. at 907 n.3 (finding no intent to harm others where a four-and-one-half-year-old

child participated in an act in which another young child was burned).

39. See Bartoletti v. Kushner, 231 S.E.2d 358, 358-59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a

child one month short of 12 years of age is under the age of criminal responsibility and immune

from a tort suit); Scarboro v. Lauk, 210 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (“The defendant child

being six years of age at the time of the alleged tort was, as a matter of law, not liable therefore even

though wilful.”); Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (precluding

liability to children under seven years of age for intentional torts); DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d

109, 112 (Ohio 1975) (“[C]hildren under the age of seven also should not be held liable for

intentional torts.”). But see Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 307 (Colo. 1974) (applying an intent

test requiring commission of an intentional act and an intent to make harmful contact to a three and

four-year-old who admitted to dropping a baby that resulted in crushing the baby’s skull); Seaburg

v. Williams, 161 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (finding that whether a six-year-old who set

a fire had intent is a fact question). For a summary of states decisions, see Donald Paul Duffala,

Annotation, Modern Trends as to Tort Liability of Child of Tender Years, 27 A.L.R. 4th 15, 15

(1981).

40. See Duffala, supra note 39, at 15.

41. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992).

42. See id.; see also Farmer in the Dell Enters., Inc. v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Del., Inc.,

514 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 1986); Physicians Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio

1991).

43. See Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 845.

44. See Aylward, supra note 16, at 186.

45. Id.

child under a certain age cannot form intent. For example, in Carey v. Reeve,

the court did not discuss the issue of whether the act may have been intentional

because of a conclusive presumption that children under six years of age cannot

form the intent to harm others. For the most part, the presumption is applied

in cases of children who are younger than eight years old.

However, the majority of courts do not conclusively presume a lack of intent

in children of particular ages, but rather use tests to determine the child’s intent.

Even courts that apply a conclusive presumption utilize a variety of tests to

determine intent in children above certain ages. These tests are the same tests

used to determine intent in adults. The test used by the majority of courts

requires that two conditions be satisfied in order to trigger the intentional acts

exclusion: (1) the insured intended to do the act that caused the injury, and (2)

the insured intended to cause some kind of injury. Typically, the second part

of the test is the main issue when determining if coverage exists under a

homeowners insurance policy.

Intent can be actual or inferred. Actual intent to cause injury is determined

either by an objective or a subjective standard. An objective standard invokes

a reasonable person test: “whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of

the insured, would have expected or intended the injuries to occur.” A

subjective standard focuses on the specific insured and whether she intended to

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 671

46. See id.

47. See id.

48. See id.

49. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992). But see Gouger v.

Hardtke, 482 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Wis. 1991) (outlining a somewhat different test for inferred intent;

whether the act is intentional and substantially certain to cause injury).

50. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 698 N.E.2d 271, 276-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

51. See id. at 276.

52. See, e.g., Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Anspach, 672 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ohio Ct. App.

1996).

53. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)

(“Although the exclusion is inapplicable when the perpetrator acts without any intent or expectation

of causing injury, it is applicable when he acts with an intent to cause injury but the actual injury

differs from the one intended or expected.”) (citations omitted); Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 845; Easley

v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 847 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that

insured’s desire to limit the victim’s injury to a bloody nose instead of the serious cuts he received

was of no consequence; all that was required was insured’s intent to injure the victim).

54. 207 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. 1973).

55. See id. at 355.

56. See id.

57. See id.

58. See id.

59. Paige E. Fiedler, Case Note, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 921, 924 (1993).

cause harm. Age is a factor in determining intent under both the objective and

subjective intent standards.

Intent can also be inferred as a matter of law. It may be inferred both from

the nature of the act and the accompanying foreseeability of harm. For

example, many jurisdictions infer intent as a matter of law in cases of sexual

molestation of children, regardless of whether the act is committed by an adult

or minor, because the act of sexual molestation is inherently harmful. Ohio

50 51

courts have also extend the inferred intent rule to gunshots at point blank range.

Once a court finds actual or inferred intent to cause injury, most consider

differences in magnitude or character between the actual injury and the intended

injury immaterial in determining whether insurance coverage exists. For

example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Wagner, a fifteen-year-old boy shot

his friend to cover up some burglaries they had committed together. The boy

only intended to wound his friend by shooting him in the stomach but the bullet

hit his friend’s heart and he died. The court found the act of shooting was

intended but the actual, more serious, injury was not. However, the court held

that even though only a wound, rather than death, was intended, the intentional

acts exclusion in the homeowners insurance policy applied, excluding insurance

compensation. The two-part majority test, containing both the actual and

inferred intent standards, is “well-established, well-reasoned, consistent with the

parties’ reasonable expectations, and consistent with public policy.”

672 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

60. See, e.g., Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Wis. 1979).

61. Id.

62. See Fiedler, supra note 59, at 924.

63. See id.

64. See Pachucki, 278 N.W.2d at 901.

65. See Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246, 1247-48 (N.H. 1994).

66. See id. at 1248.

67. See id.

68. See, e.g., Physicians Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d 906, 908 (Ohio 1991); Willis v.

Campbell, No. 97-CA-57, 1998 WL 46685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1998).

69. See Swanson, 569 N.E.2d at 908.

70. Id. (citation omitted).

The test used by a minority of courts follows classic tort doctrine. It looks

to the “natural and probable consequences of the insured’s act.” The minority

view is similar to the majority view’s inferred intent test in that both tests focus

on the act itself and the probability or foreseeability of harm. Intent is not

needed to determine whether insurance coverage applies under either the

majority or minority test. Just as with the inferred intent standard in the majority

test, age is not considered when applying the natural and probable consequences

test. It is arguable that an injury resulting from a negligent act is often a natural

or probable consequence of the act and thus, not covered by insurance under the

minority view. Thus, the minority view has been criticized because it only

allows insurance coverage for acts when the insured is not negligent.

Another view that has received little support requires that the insured has

specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered. New Hampshire courts

adhere to this view. Although they recognize their approach represents a

minority view, the New Hampshire courts, adhering to the principle of stare

decisis, refuse to overrule previous decisions. They put the onus on insurance

companies to draft a carefully written exclusion in order to avoid the specific

intent test.

These three tests are applied to both the homeowners policy’s definition of

occurrence and the intentional acts exclusion. An insurance company may

argue to exclude an act under both the policy’s definition of occurrence and the

intentional acts exclusion. Alternatively, an insurance policy may be written on

an occurrence basis but may not contain an intentional acts exclusion. In these

cases, courts have treated the occurrence definition and the intentional acts

exclusion as establishing essentially the same limits on liability insurance

coverage. The Ohio Supreme Court compared an insurance policy containing

the intentional acts exclusion with another policy limiting coverage to accidents

and declared “the ‘effect of both policies is the same’ and they should be treated

‘in like manner.’”

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 673

71. See Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 476 (Kan. 1983). Approximately 33,000 people are

injured each year by BB or pellet guns. See Health Updates, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 17, 1995, at

C1. Eighty percent of these injuries are to children between the ages of five and nineteen. See id.

Over 2000 of the injuries require hospitalization. See id.

72. Decisions that find insurance coverage applies include State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973); Providence Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Scanlon, 638

A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994); Physicians Insurance Co. v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1991).

Decisions holding insurance coverage does not apply include American Family Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Wubbena, 496 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468 (Kan. 1983);

Chapman v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corp., 523 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).

73. See Bell, 674 P.2d at 477; Wubbena, 496 N.W.2d at 785.

74. 674 P.2d 468, 470 (Kan. 1983).

75. See id.

76. See id.

77. Id. at 477. However, in this case, the court did not find that the 11-year-old had aimed

directly at the victim’s face. Instead of inferring intent, the court applied a subjective test and

excluded the act from insurance coverage by finding that the minor had either the desire to cause

the consequences of his act or believed the consequences were substantially certain to result. See

id.

78. See id.

79. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wubbena, 496 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa Ct. App.

1992).

III. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE TESTS TO INTENTIONAL ACTS

COMMITTED BY MINORS

A. Shootings with BB Guns

Although a BB gun is not considered a firearm, it is capable of shooting a

pellet with enough force to cause severe injury. Courts are divided on whether

shootings involving BB guns are excluded from insurance coverage. The

decisions in the majority of cases hinge on the subjective intent of the minor

shooter to cause injury, although two cases infer intent due to the certainty of the

injury. In Bell v. Tilton, an eleven-year-old boy participated in a game where

73 74

he shot at other children from approximately thirty feet away as they raced across

an open doorway. The shooter aimed directly at the children as they ran from

side to side. A BB hit one of the children in the eye causing a severe injury.

75 76

The court stated, “the act of shooting another in the face with a BB pellet is one

which is recognized as an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm it can

be said an actor who performed the act intended the resulting harm. . . .” Thus,

the minor’s act was not covered by insurance.

A more recent decision broadens the circumstances under which intent can

be inferred. In 1992, the Court of Appeals of Iowa found intent to cause bodily

injury when a person shoots a BB in the direction of another person. The court

stated that intent can be inferred as a matter of law because of the inherent harm

674 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

80. See id.

81. See id. at 783.

82. Id.

83. See id.

84. See id. at 785.

85. See Chapman v. Wisconsin Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 523 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1994); see also Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 477 (Kan. 1983).

86. See Chapman, 523 N.W.2d at 153-54.

87. See id. at 154.

88. See id.

89. See id.

90. See id.

91. See id.; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973);

supra text accompanying notes 49-59. But see Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d

1246, 1247-48 (N.H. 1994) (holding the intentional acts exclusion is met only if the insured

actually intended the particular injury).

92. See Scanlon, 638 A.2d at 1249.

93. See id.

94. See id. at 1247.

found in the act of shooting a BB gun and the foreseeability of the harm

accompanying such an act. The case involved a fifteen-year-old boy who, with

friends, was shooting BB pellets at cans. The boys began to scuffle and the

fifteen-year-old told his friend, “I’m going to get you.” He then fired two shots

in the direction of his friend from eighty to ninety feet away, striking his friend

in the eye. The court broadened the decision in Bell by inferring intent to injure

not only when the shooter aims directly at his victim’s face, but also when shots

are fired in the direction of the victim from a substantial distance.

Another recent decision did not infer intent as a matter of law, but reached

the same result by looking at the subjective intent of the minor shooter. The

case involved a fourteen-year-old boy who was playing a BB gun war game with

friends. During the game he aimed in the general direction of his friend, from

approximately seventy-five feet away, and fired, injuring his friend in the eye.

He did not take careful aim nor could he see his friend clearly as he fired. The

minor insured believed the shot would cause a sting but nothing more serious.

The court applied the majority view test and found intent to injure because the

minor insured knew injury (a sting) would result from the shot. It did not

matter that the resulting injury to the eye was different from the intended sting

injury. In general, courts that believe that a BB gunshot is likely to injure find

intent regardless of the age of the shooter and whether the shot is aimed directly

at the victim.

On the other hand, a New Hampshire decision specifically found that the act

of shooting with a BB gun is not certain to result in some type of injury. The

court applied a subjective intent standard to find the sixteen-year-old had not

intended injury. The sixteen-year-old boy participated in a “game” where he

and other boys shot at each other from about fifty feet away. During the game,

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 675

95. See id.

96. See id. at 1249.

97. See Physicians Ins. Co. Ohio v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio 1991).

98. See id.

99. See id. at 907.

100. See id.

101. See id.

102. See id.

103. See id. at 911.

104. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973).

105. The court did not state that the trial judge’s findings were incorrect but hinted that in

reviewing the evidence they might have come to a different conclusion. See id. There was

conflicting evidence presented from which the trial court could have found that the minor aimed

at the car’s occupant and intended to hit him. See id. at 365.

106. See id. at 367.

107. See id. at 366.

which lasted about an hour, three boys were hit by BB pellets without incurring

injury. However, a later shot by the sixteen-year-old, from a distance of eighty

to ninety feet, hit another boy in the eye. In deciding that intent could not be

inferred and that the minor insured did not intend to cause injury, the court relied

heavily on the fact that three previous shots had not caused an injury.

The Ohio Supreme Court has also found that injury from a BB gun shot is

not substantially certain to occur. Thus, intent to injure was not inferred and

the court looked at the minor’s subjective intent. A teenage boy responding to

a previous unfriendly encounter with a group of young adults shot his BB gun

three times in the direction of the group. A member of the group was hit and

subsequently lost his right eye. The teenage boy was approximately seventy

100

to one-hundred feet away from the group and testified that he was aiming at a

sign about fifteen to twenty feet away from the group. He also testified that

101

his objective in shooting was to scare the group of young adults. While the

102

court (applying the majority-view subjective test) found the act intentional, the

court was persuaded that the insured did not intend to injure the victim. Thus,

the court held the intentional acts exclusion did not apply.

103

Finally, the Nebraska Supreme Court also held that a minor’s act of firing a

BB gun, from a slow moving car, in the direction of the victim is not excluded

from insurance coverage. The trial court found that the minor did not take

104

careful aim and that he fired only to scare someone. However, the court

105

distinguished between types of acts that by their nature will likely cause harm

and other acts where harm is unexpected, and placed this BB gun shooting in the

latter category. The court then employed the subjective intent to injure

106

standard and held that the minor did not intend to injure based on the trial court

findings.

107

Although age can be a factor in determining subjective intent, none of the

courts specifically address age as an issue. Instead, courts seem divided over

whether a BB gun is substantially certain to cause injury. Courts who accept that

676 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

108. See Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1294 (10th Cir. 1996)

(applying Oklahoma law); Worrell v. Daniel, 698 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).

109. See id. at 1294.

110. Salazar, 77 F.3d at 1293.

111. See id. at 1293 n.1.

112. See id. at 1293.

113. See id. at 1297.

114. See id.

115. Id. (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla.

1951)).

116. Accord Worrell v. Daniel, 698 N.E.2d 494, 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (relying on the

analysis used in Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Salazar, the court held that any claims

resulting from a minor’s killing of his victim by shooting and striking her with a brick are precluded

from coverage because the act was intentional and did not constitute an occurrence).

a BB gun pellet is likely to harm hold the intentional acts exclusion applies.

Courts that do not accept the substantial certainty proposition delve into the

insured’s subjective intent and are willing to find insurance coverage for shooters

who only intend to scare their victims or where previous shots fired from a BB

gun have not resulted in injury.

B. Shootings with Firearms

Even more dangerous than shooting a BB gun is shooting a firearm. Most

courts recognize the foreseeability of causing harm by shooting a gun, and while

applying different tests, courts utilize either the occurrence definition or the

intentional acts exclusion to exclude such acts from homeowners insurance

coverage. In two recent cases, insureds have appealed lower court judgments in

favor of insurance carriers contending that the shootings were within the policy’s

definition of occurrence. In Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v.

108

Salazar, a sixteen-year-old boy gave a friend his gun. Later, the boy and his

109

friend instigated a dispute with some other youths. The argument escalated

110

and the insured’s friend fired at least one shot into another youth’s vehicle,

killing the vehicle owner. The victim’s mother brought a wrongful death suit

against the minor insured, alleging negligent entrustment of the minor’s gun to

his friend. The minor’s insurance carrier then initiated a declaratory judgment

111

action to determine whether it had an obligation to defend or indemnify the minor

insured. On appeal, the circuit court ruled in favor of the insurance

112

company. In its decision, the court held that the insured’s participation in the

113

intentional murder of the victim by the insured’s friend was not an accident and

therefore not within the policy’s occurrence definition. The court defined “an

114

accident as an event from an unknown cause, or an unexpected event from a

known cause.” In so ruling, the court appears to have adopted an inferred

115

intent test—the act of shooting where a death occurs is not unexpected or

unforeseeable, and thus intent is inferred.

116

Similarly, in shootings involving injury other than death, courts are still

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 677

117. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dillard, 859 F. Supp. 1501 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 1285

(11th Cir. 1995).

118. See Willis v. Campbell, No. 97-CA-57, 1998 WL 46685, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6,

1998).

119. See Dillard, 859 F. Supp. at 1504.

120. See id.

121. Id. at 1502, 1503 (emphasis added).

122. See id.

123. See id. The boy asked the other kids he was playing with before the shooting, “[W]hich

one of you wants to feel what it’s like to be shot.” Id. at 1502 (quoting from the Trial Transcript,

p. 36).

124. See id. at 1503.

125. See id. at 1504; see also Western Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 700,

704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a minor who shot a person, who was within six or seven feet

of the minor, several times hitting him in both arms acted with intent to commit great bodily injury).

But see Putnam v. Zeluff, 127 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Mich. 1964) (holding that a minor’s act of

shooting at a dog whom the minor considered wild, with only the intent to protect himself from

attack, was covered by insurance).

126. See Willis v. Campbell, No. 97-CA-57, 1998 WL 46685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6,

1998).

unwilling to find insurance coverage. This is true whether the insured fires

directly at the victim or fires at the victim’s car. Applying the majority view

117 118

test and using an objective standard, a Georgia court found that a reasonable

thirteen-year-old should have anticipated that intentionally aiming and firing a

revolver near a person’s head would result in a bullet wound. Hence,

119

insurance did not cover the injury because it was a reasonably expected result of

an intentional act. The court was required to apply an objective standard

120

because the policy would not “cover any bodily injury which may reasonably be

expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or

which is in fact intended by an insured person.”

121

The same court also applied a subjective standard under the majority view

test and still found no coverage for the shooting. In its discussion, the court

122

considered the minor’s age but, nevertheless, found that the act was intentional

because of the boy’s statements prior to the shooting and his careful aim when

shooting. In conjunction with the intentional act, the court held that the

123

thirteen-year-old’s statements showed his appreciation of the probable and

foreseeable results of his intentional act. The two elements of the majority

124

view test, intent to do the act and intent to cause injury, were satisfied.

Therefore, under both the objective and subjective intent to injure standards, the

court held that the homeowner’s insurance policy excluded injury resulting from

the thirteen-year-old’s act of shooting directly at a victim.

125

Similarly, an Ohio court applied the majority view test and found a fourteen-

year-old’s act of shooting at a car was substantially certain to cause injury and,

thereby, excluded from homeowners coverage. The fourteen-year-old boy

126

678 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

127. See id. at *1.

128. See id. at *3.

129. 588 A.2d 363, 365 (N.H. 1991).

130. See id.

131. See id.

132. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 804 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Kan. 1991).

133. See id.

134. See id.

135. See id.

136. This same logic could be applied to children as well, although it is arguable whether

children are able to conform their conduct to permissible standards.

137. See Williams, 804 P.2d at 1382.

138. See id. at 1381.

139. See Economy Preferred Ins. Co. v. Mass, 497 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Neb. 1993).

140. See Williams, 804 P.2d at 1381-82 (holding that a 14-year-old mentally ill boy’s act of

firing a rifle several times in school, thereby wounding teachers and students and killing the

principal, was not covered by insurance because the boy understood the nature and quality of his

fired a number of rifle shots at a car and injured another boy. Both boys

127

testified that the minor insured was aiming at the car, not the victim, and the

injury to the other boy was accidental. However, the court held that a reasonable

person knows that firing a rifle four or more times into an occupied car is

substantially certain to result in injury to the occupants.

128

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire hinted at an exception to labeling

shooting with a firearm as an intentional act in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Stamp.

129

This court found a minor’s act of aiming and firing a loaded firearm directly at

a police officer is reasonably expected to cause injury. However, the court

130

intimated that the first part of the majority view test, intent to do the act, might

not be met if the minor acted unconsciously or involuntarily.

131

Intent is also frequently at issue in cases involving mentally ill persons.

132

There are two conflicting lines of authority as to whether an act by an insured

suffering from a mental illness is intentional and, thus, excluded from insurance

coverage. The first line of cases holds that the intentional acts exclusion does

133

not apply to the act and its resulting injury if the insured suffers from a mental

illness. This body of cases finds insurance coverage for acts by mentally ill

134

persons. The underlying public policy consideration is that a mentally ill person,

who is unable to conform his conduct to acceptable standards, will not perform

an act solely because insurance will not cover the resulting injury. Therefore,

135

applying the intentional acts exclusion is inappropriate because it does not deter

a mentally ill person from engaging in anti-social conduct. This position also

136

reinforces society’s interest in compensating victims.

137

The second line of cases excludes a mentally ill person’s act from insurance

coverage if the person understands the nature and consequences of his acts and

had the intent to cause the injury. An act by a mentally ill person can be

138

excluded even if the insured is found criminally insane or incapable of

139

distinguishing right from wrong. This line of authority broadens the definition

140

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 679

acts and intended to cause injury).

141. A third view is outlined by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State Farm Fire & Casualty

Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1991). The court held, for the purpose of applying the

intentional act exclusion in the homeowners insurance policy, that

an insured’s acts are deemed unintentional where, because of mental illness or defect,

the insured does not know the nature or wrongfulness of an act, or where, because of

mental illness or defect, the insured is deprived of the ability to control his conduct

regardless of any understanding of the nature of the act or its wrongfulness.

Id. at 331.

142. This exception also applies to mentally ill adults. See Aylward, supra note 16, at 193-

94.

143. Another possible exception is self defense. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Berray, 694 P.2d 191,

193 (Ariz. 1984) (holding, in a case involving an adult, that the insured’s act of shooting a .357

Magnum firearm was committed in self defense and, thus, not an intentional act within the meaning

of the insurance policy’s exclusion).

144. See Bell v. Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 477 (Kan. 1983).

145. See id.

146. See id.

147. See Weisbart v. Flohr, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).

of intentional act, thereby excluding some acts by mentally ill persons from

insurance coverage. Both lines of authority formulate an exception to the

141

general rule excluding firearm shootings from insurance coverage. However, the

exception is limited in its application to mentally ill minors, and in some cases

only to mentally ill minors who do not intend to cause injury.

142

The cases consistently show that shootings with firearms are excluded from

insurance coverage if the minor is a teenager who shoots in the victim’s

direction. A very limited exception may exist when the insured is mentally ill.

143

Still unanswered is whether firearm shootings by younger minors, between seven

and twelve years old, will be excluded from insurance coverage. Whether an

eight-year-old child intends injury to result from shooting a gun has yet to be

decided on appeal. A decision involving another type of intentional act sheds

some light on the question. In 1983, the Kansas Supreme Court held that an

eleven-year-old who aims and shoots a BB gun at another intends to cause

injury. Using the subjective standard under the majority view test, the court

144

found the eleven-year-old intended to injure when he aimed directly at the victim

from thirty feet away. The court decided that a BB gun pellet can injure and

145

that an eleven-year-old can understand and intend injury when shooting a BB

gun. Applying this decision to firearm shootings, it is reasonable to infer that

146

an eleven-year-old can intend to injure when shooting a gun.

If eleven-year-olds can form the intent to injure, then can younger minors

likewise form that intent? None of the BB gun or firearm cases involve seven to

ten-year-olds. However, an older court decision found a seven-year-old boy had

committed a wilful battery when he shot an arrow in the general direction of a

five-year-old girl and severely injured her eye. The court considered a number

147

680 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

148. See id. at 119.

149. See id.

150. See Perrochet & Colella, supra note 35, at 1351 (“Research in child psychology now

suggests that chronological age alone is an insufficient measure of a child’s capacity to foresee the

consequences of action and to . . . refrain from harming others.”).

151. The same analysis can be applied to younger children who shoot BB guns, causing

injury. However, courts are less certain as to the probability of injury when the act involves a BB

gun. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107.

152. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1973); Physicians Ins.

Co. v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1991).

153. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107; see also Willis v. Campbell, No. 97-CA-57,

1998 WL 46685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1998).

154. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107.

of factors in making its determination. Several of the factors relate to intent

148

to injure. The boy knew it was wrong to point an arrow at another person (his

father had warned him never to shoot an arrow at anyone); he also knew a bow

and arrow could be dangerous if used improperly. These factors, along with

149

the probability of injury when a gun is fired, can be used to determine a child’s

intent to injure when shooting a firearm at another person. Today, with the

prevalence of media reports of shootings and television shows displaying

violence, it would be difficult to prove that a young minor does not understand

what will happen if he aims and shoots a gun directly at another person. It is

150

likely that a court, applying these factors coupled with the high probability of

injury, will ultimately exclude firearm shootings by younger minors from

insurance coverage.

151

The other issue that has not been clearly decided by the courts involves

random firearm shootings. Rather than just firing directly at a person, a minor

shoots into the air or in the victim’s general vicinity merely to scare him. Two

of these BB gun cases center on the minor’s intent to scare rather than to

injure. Both of the courts distinguished acts where injury was substantially

152

certain to occur from acts where injury was less likely to occur. Because

153

injury was not substantially certain to occur, the courts applied other tests to

determine intent to injure. However, it is more probable that injury will result

154

from shooting a firearm, even randomly, than from shooting a BB gun. Still,

even with a greater likelihood of injury, courts may find a younger child less

likely to understand that a gunshot fired in the air or aimed at the wall has the

potential to injure, and thus find insurance coverage for the intentional act.

C. Physical Assaults

Similar to acts involving firearms, physical assaults—punches—by teenagers

are usually excluded from insurance. Regardless of which test is applied to

determine intent to injure, the outcomes are consistent: a teenager intends to

injure her victim whether she punches him many times, twice, or only once.

Many of the cases, regardless of the number of punches infer intent as a matter

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 681

155. 543 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1996).

156. See id.

157. See id. at 872; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bullock, No. 387111, 1997 WL

309584, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 30, 1997) (holding that the very nature of the act—pushing

the victim to the ground, striking him multiple times, and causing him to lose

consciousness—shows the harm to the injured party must have been intended). The Connecticut

court also justified its decision based on reasonableness; a reasonable insured could not expect his

insurance policy to pay for the injuries resulting from such a “fierce and brutal beating of another

individual.” Id. at *7 (citation omitted). In addition, the court discussed the public policy rationale;

if these types of acts are covered, the liability policy could be used as a “license to wreak havoc at

will.” Id. (citation omitted). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boonyam, 597 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (N.Y.

App. Div. 1993) (upholding summary judgment for the insurer because the harm caused by

repeatedly striking a 15-year-old in the head with a hammer and stabbing him in the chest is not

within the insurance policy’s coverage provisions).

158. The babysitter was covered under a farm liability policy. The policy’s intentional acts

exclusion language is identical to the typical language found in a homeowners policy. See De

Groot, 543 N.W.2d at 870-71.

159. See Simpson v. Angel, 598 So. 2d 584, 585-86 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

160. Id. at 585.

161. See id.

162. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107.

163. See supra text accompanying notes 108-53.

164. See Simpson, 598 So. 2d at 585; see also Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d

885, 887 (Minn. 1978) (holding a 16-year-old’s striking of another boy’s head, which resulted in

a continuing epileptic condition, was not covered by insurance even though the actual injury was

more severe than the intended injury).

of law because of the nature of the act and the accompanying foreseeability of

harm.

The Iowa Supreme Court addressed the issue of repetitious blows in

American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. De Groot. A thirteen-year-old

155

babysitter became upset when a five-month-old child would not stop crying.

156

The babysitter struck the child’s head on the floor three times and the baby died.

The court applied the majority view test and held that the repetitive nature of the

act (three blows) supported an inferred intent to injure. As a result of the

157

court’s decision, insurance did not cover the babysitter’s act or compensate the

parents of the dead child.

158

Similarly, two punches may also infer an intent to injure. A minor’s act of

punching another boy two times, causing bones to fracture in the victim’s face,

convincingly shows an intention to cause bodily harm. The court stated,

159

“[p]unches or blows are intended to put the other person in pain and/or fear.”

160

The court also addressed the extent of the injury. The minor argued that he did

not intend to fracture bones in the victim’s face. However, just as in cases

161

involving BB guns and firearms, the court held that even though the extent

162 163

of the injury was greater than intended, the insurance policy’s intentional acts

exclusion still excluded coverage for the act of punching.

164

682 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

165. “One punch, arguendo might be unintentional, but two punches certainly indicate an

intention to cause bodily harm to the victim.” Simpson, 598 So. 2d at 585-86.

166. See, e.g., Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Fire Ins. Exch.

v. Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1979).

167. 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).

168. See id. at 362.

169. 279 N.W.2d 388, 389 (Neb. 1979).

170. See id. at 389-90.

171. See Clark, 529 P.2d at 1196.

172. See id.

173. See id.; Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365; Jones, 279 N.W.2d at 391.

174. See Clark, 529 P.2d at 1196; Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362; Jones, 279 N.W.2d at 390.

175. Jones, 279 N.W.2d at 392.

176. 592 So. 2d 506 (La. Ct. App. 1991).

177. See id. at 507.

The majority of cases center around acts involving only one punch.

Although the Louisiana court distinguishes two punches from one punch,

165

several courts have inferred intent to injure from just one blow. The cases all

166

involve surprise attacks. In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Altieri, a fifteen-year-

167

old boy put on a boxing glove, walked up behind a ninth grade boy, grabbed the

boy’s hair in his left hand, and punched the boy in the mouth with his right

hand. Although the boys had previously exchanged “words,” the fifteen-year-

168

old had left only to return later and punch the younger boy. A similar situation

occurred in Jones v. Norval where an eighteen-year-old had “words” with a

169

twelfth grader. When the twelfth grader tried to leave, the minor insured struck

him with his fist, breaking the twelfth grader’s jaw and knocking him

unconscious. Finally, in Clark v. Allstate Insurance Co., one high school

170

student tapped another high school student, whom he did not know, on the

back. As the boy turned around, the student struck him in the face, crushing

171

the boy’s cheekbone.

172

All three courts held that the nature of the acts inferred intent to injure.

173

Although the attackers each said they did not intend to seriously hurt their

victims, the courts nevertheless found the acts inherently harmful. The courts

174

echoed the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding that, “[w]here an 18-year-old man

intentionally hits another person in the face with his fist, with force enough to

knock the person unconscious, an intent to cause bodily injury can be inferred as

a matter of law, and the subjective intent of the actor is immaterial.”

175

Courts that do not infer intent as a matter of law often find intent to injure

under either the objective or subjective standard used in the majority view test.

In Cavalier v. Suberville, a teenager, who had previously argued with a former

176

friend, grabbed the friend from behind, turned him around, and punched him in

the face. The punch broke several bones. The insurance policy’s intentional acts

exclusion included the word “reasonably” in its language and the court applied

an objective standard. The court held that any person would reasonably expect

177

injury to result from the teenager’s act and, thus, the intentional acts provision

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 683

178. See id.; see also Pendergraft v. Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co., 342 F.2d 427,

429 (10th Cir. 1965).

179. See Easley v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 847 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Mo. Ct. App.

1992).

180. See id. at 811.

181. See id. at 814.

182. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58, 85-91.

183. See id.; see also James E. Berger, Note, Liability Insurers Get a Fair Deal; Easley v.

American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 59 MO. L. REV. 209 (1994) (discussing Missouri law

before and after the Easley decision and outlining the public policy goals that are advanced through

use of the subjective standard).

184. See Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 1994).

185. See id. at 419.

186. See id. at 420.

187. See id. But see Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 911 F. Supp. 230, 234 (S.D.

Miss. 1995) (discussing the case of a 16-year-old boy hitting a woman who had pushed his mother).

The court stated that “[i]t appears that the majority view does not allow self-defense as an exception

to a policy’s intentional-act exclusion when a punch, as here, is thrown with a purpose to injure.”

Id. at 231.

188. 490 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Iowa 1992).

excluded insurance coverage for the punch.

178

Even when using a subjective standard under the majority view test, the

Missouri Court of Appeals held the insured’s act of one punch is excluded from

insurance coverage. In Easley, two boys fought during a high school

179

basketball practice. After practice one of the boys waited outside for the other

180

boy and hit him on the chin as he walked out of the school building. The boy fell

backward and seriously injured his ear, nearly severing it from his head. The

court found the minor attacker had acted wilfully and deliberately with intent to

injure his victim. As in previous cases, the attacker’s intent only to bloody

181 182

the boy’s nose or blacken his eye was of no consequence; intent to cause even a

slight injury was all that was required.

183

Exceptions to the general rule excluding acts of punching from insurance

coverage also revolve around the insured’s intent to injure. In cases of self-

defense the intentional acts exclusion may not apply. In a South Carolina case,

184

two high school boys engaged in a fist fight. One of the boys was injured and

185

sued the other participant. The court found that the victim provoked the fight and

that the attacker was reacting to the victim when he struck him in the face.

186

Because the attacker only intended to protect himself and not to inflict a specific

injury on the victim, the court cited self-defense and held that the intentional acts

exclusion did not apply.

187

A recent case highlights the level of intent needed to cause an injury. In

Amco Insurance Co. v. Haht, an eleven-year-old boy struck another child with

188

a baseball after a neighborhood game. The ball hit the child in the temple,

causing death. The court applied the majority view test and held that the eleven-

year-old’s intent to hurt his playmate did not rise to the level of intent needed to

684 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

189. See id. at 845; see also American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D. Conn.

1965) (finding that the intentional acts exclusion did not apply when a 13-year-old boy threw a

Coke bottle and hit another child because he only intended to frighten rather than injure); Walker

v. Kelly, 314 A.2d 785, 788 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973) (holding that a five-year-old did not wilfully or

maliciously intend to injure another child when she threw a rock at him); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co.

v. Shields, 187 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (holding under an insurance policy

excluding acts for bodily injury caused intentionally or at the direction of the insured, that the

exclusion did not apply when the insured minor hit the young man in the shoulder and/or chest area

while another boy kicked him in the testicles and the injury suffered by the young man was to his

testicles). But see Waters v. Blackshear, 591 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1992) (finding that a minor

less than 10 years old intended harmful contact when he placed a fire cracker in a seven-year-old’s

shoe).

190. Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 845.

191. See id. at 846 (Snell, J., dissenting); see also Paul B. Ahlers, Note, Amco Insurance Co.

v. Haht: Iowa’s Definition of Insurance Intent, 79 IOWA L. REV. 203 (1993) (questioning the

validity of the court’s decision).

192. See Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 847 (Snell, J., dissenting).

193. See id. at 846.

194. See id. at 847-48.

195. See id. at 846.

196. See supra text accompanying notes 165-83.

197. See Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 845.

cause bodily injury. The court stated that, “[a]n eleven-year-old boy, animated

189

by an obscure playground snit, lacks the same capacity to formulate an intent to

injure that is possessed by an adult, or even a youth of more maturity.”

190

The dissent in Haht takes issue with the majority carving out an exception

191

for eleven-year-olds who injure others in playground disputes. Justice Snell

192

argues that the majority’s opinion results in a specific intent test: the insured

must intend the specific injury suffered in order to apply the intentional acts

exclusion. The dissent points out that the majority’s view promotes

193

compassion for the victim but does not adhere to stare decisis. Additionally,

194

the dissent stresses that the decision leads to uncertainty as to what insurance

companies are insuring against.

195

Courts find intent to injure when a teenager punches another. The nature of

a punch is so certain to cause injury that intent to injure can be inferred or found

through either the objective or the subjective tests. This is especially true when

the punch is a surprise to the person who was hit and applies even when there

were previous altercations between the parties. In a very limited exception,

196

when an insured minor hits another only to protect himself, the court may then

find insurance coverage for injury.

Less clear is whether younger children, ages seven through twelve, form an

intent to injure when punching or throwing an object at another child. The Haht

court carved out an exception that could conceivably be applied to younger

children. The court found that younger children do not have the same capacity

197

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198. See id.

199. See supra text accompanying notes 155-83.

200. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.

201. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.

202. Cases which exclude acts of setting fires from insurance coverage include: United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American Employers’ Insurance Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (Cal. Ct. App.

1984); Home Insurance Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 663 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1995); Farmer

in the Dell Enterprises, Inc. v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. of Delaware, Inc., 514 A.2d 1097

(Del. 1986); Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n v. Medina, 329 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975);

City of Newton v. Krasnigor, 536 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. 1989); Metropolitan Property & Casualty

Insurance Co. v. Ham, 930 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cigany,

No. 73230, 73242, 1998 WL 655495 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1998); Unigard Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 579 P.2d 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).

203. Cases in which insurance covers acts of setting fires include: Seaburg v. Williams, 161

N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 1985); Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Nestor, 145 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966);

Michigan Millers Insurance Co. v. Anspach, 672 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Eisenman v.

Hornberger, 264 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1970); Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Insurance Co., 231 S.E.2d 701

(S.C. 1977); Prosser v. Leuck, 539 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).

204. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

205. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cigany, No. 73230, 73242, 1998 WL 655495, at *3 (Ohio

Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1998).

to formulate an intent to injure as is possessed by a more mature youth. Most

198

children know that a hit, either by using a fist or by throwing an object, is going

to hurt because they have received such a hit at one time or another. But whether

a younger child understands that a physical injury is likely to occur, as a result

of the hit or throw, is questionable. Unlike punches by teenagers where intent is

often inferred, the younger minor’s intelligence, maturity, past experiences and

199

conduct, and the circumstances surrounding the hit may assist in determining

whether intent to injure exists. However, public policy may offset such

considerations. Social norms support the belief that anti-social conduct should

200

not be rewarded. All people, even young children, should face the

201

consequences of their actions.

D. Arson

Unlike the cases in the other categories that caused bodily injury, virtually

all the cases involving arsons resulted only in property damage. Perhaps this is

one of the reasons the case decisions are split fairly evenly between not

insuring and insuring intentional acts of setting fires. Age also appears to

202 203

be a more significant factor in determining intent to injure.

As in some of the firearm shooting cases, an Ohio appellate court excluded

204

a fire set by a high school student from insurance coverage by applying the

occurrence definition. A high school student used a lighter to set fire to a

205

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206. See id. at *1.

207. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).

208. See id. at *3; see also Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1015, 1018

(Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (defining “accident” to require a result that is unforeseen, involuntary,

unexpected, and unusual and finding an 11-year-old’s deliberate act of setting a fire in a school

building voluntary).

209. See City of Newton v. Krasnigor, 536 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Mass. 1989).

210. See id. at 1080.

211. See id. at 1080-81.

212. See id. at 1082.

213. See id. at 1081 n.7.

214. See Farmer in the Dell Enters., Inc. v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Del., Inc., 514 A.2d

1097, 1099 ( Del. 1986); Ash/Ramunno Assocs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 95C-

11-158 SCD, 1996 WL 658819, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1996); Metropolitan Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Ham, 930 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).

215. See Farmer in the Dell Enters., Inc., 514 A.2d at 1099-1100.

216. See id. at 1100.

217. See Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 930 S.W.2d at 6.

218. See id. at 7.

teddy bear located in the school’s storage area. The fire spread and caused

206

over $500,000 in property damage. The court construed the word “accidental”

in the occurrence definition to mean “an unexpected happening without intention

or design.” In applying the definition, the court found the insured intended to

207

cause property damage, and thus his actions were not accidental and were outside

of the occurrence definition.

208

Under the intentional exclusion clause, intent to cause injury, in the form of

property damage, can be inferred as a matter of law. Three youths broke into

209

an unattended junior high school and set numerous small fires, including lighting

matches in boxes of library books in several different locations. The youths

210

then left without attempting to extinguish the fires. Approximately $1.3 million

in property damage resulted from the fires. The court found that the insured

211

youth intended to cause property damage to the school. In inferring intent, the

212

court considered the nature of the act—setting fires in an unattended

building—and the foreseeability of the fire spreading.

213

Other courts have applied the majority view test but used an objective

standard. The Delaware Supreme Court decided that a juvenile’s act of

214

starting a fire in a trash pile and moving it close to a building, subsequently

destroying the building, is excluded from insurance coverage under the

intentional acts exclusion. It did not matter that the minors only intended to

215

damage the trash pile because it was entirely foreseeable that moving burning

trash close to a building would damage the building.

216

Similarly, in a Missouri case, a fourteen-year-old helped set fire to a juvenile

detention center in order to escape. The court rejected the minor’s argument

217

that the act should be covered by insurance because she only intended to create

a diversionary fire and did not intend to damage the entire building. The court

218

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219. See id.; see also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American Employers’

Insurance Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) for application of the majority view test

using the subjective standard.

220. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 at 468; Farmer in the Dell

Enters., Inc., 514 A.2d at 1100; City of Newton v. Krasnigor, 536 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Mass. 1989);

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cigany, No. 73230, 73242, 1998 WL 655495, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.

24, 1998).

221. See Prosser v. Leuck, 539 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).

222. See id.

223. See id. at 467.

224. See id.

225. See id. at 469. But see Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 903-04 (Wis.

1979).

226. See id.; see also Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Anspach, 672 N.E.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Ohio

Ct. App. 1996) (holding the resulting bodily injury from a robbery and fire to cover up the robbery

was not excluded from insurance coverage because the insured only intended property damage, did

not know the building was occupied, and could not have reasonably expected bodily injury).

227. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992). But see Westfield Ins.

Co. v. Blamer, No. 98AP-1576, 1999 WL 680162 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999) (holding that the

finding of coverage in Michigan Millers Insurance Co. v. Anspach not maintained under the law

today because the bodily injury “flowed from” the intentional acts of others directing the robbery

who knew that the house was occupied).

228. See supra text accompanying notes 188-200.

found that the destruction of the building was a natural and probable

consequence of the act and, therefore, not covered by insurance.

219

The majority of courts hold that only the intent to harm, not the extent of

harm, matters. However, a recent Wisconsin case distinguishes intent to cause

220

some harm from harm that occurred, by requiring the resultant harm to be

substantially certain to follow. Rather than using a foreseeability or probable

221

consequence standard, the court broadened insurance coverage by excluding only

acts where the resultant harm is substantially certain to follow. In Prosser, a

222

thirteen-year-old and his friends broke into a warehouse and found a gasoline can

and a lighter. The boys poured a couple of small drops of gasoline on a

223

concrete window sill and lit them. While the drops were burning, one of the boys

sprinkled more gasoline on the drops. Flames rose causing the boy to drop the

burning gasoline can. The boy then kicked it through a hole in the floor. The

224

fire spread throughout the warehouse and caused extensive damage. The court

applied the majority view test, but limited intent to injure to only cases where the

resultant harm was substantially certain to follow. The court concluded that

225

the expected harm of a stain resulting from lighting small drops of gasoline on

the window ledge insufficient to satisfy the intent to cause injury requirement.

226

The court’s rationale is similar to the Haht decision, which held that the act of

an eleven-year-old hitting his playmate with a baseball did not rise to the level

of intent needed to cause injury. In both cases, the likelihood of injury is too

227

far removed from the act to satisfy the required intent.

228

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229. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).

230. See Eisenman v. Hornberger, 264 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa. 1970).

231. See id. at 675.

232. See id.

233. See Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins. Co., 231 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 1977).

234. See id. at 702.

235. See id.

236. See id. at 703 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).

237. In its decision, the court cited an earlier case, Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Nestor, 145

N.W.2d 399, 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966), which specifically held age as the reason for not finding

intent to cause damage. See id. at 702.

238. Cf. Willis v. Campbell, No. 97-CA-S7, 1998 WL 46685, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6,

1998) (finding a reasonable thirteen-year-old should have anticipated injury when firing a gun near

a person’s head); Chapman v. Wisconsin Serv. Ins. Corp., 523 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Wisc. Ct. App.

1994) (finding a fourteen-year-old intended to injure when shooting a BB gun).

239. See Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Nestor, 145 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).

Other courts finding insurance coverage for intentional acts have looked at

the nature of the act to determine if injury is expected; the act of setting a fire

compared with a fire occurring incidental to another intentional act. In a

Maryland case, a mill was burned after boys ignited gas fumes with a cigarette

lighter they were using to illuminate their attempt to steal gas. The court held

that the boys did not intend to cause property damage. Similarly, an earlier

229

decision by a Pennsylvania court held that a seventeen-year-old who broke into

a home to steal liquor did not intend to cause property damage when a match he

lit to find his way around the house smoldered and subsequently caused a fire.

230

The Pennsylvania court also discussed possible overriding public policy

considerations that would preclude insurance coverage but found none.

231

Because the insurance policy was not purchased to cover the crime, the policy

obviously did not promote the crime, did not serve as a deterrent to the crime,

and did not save the insured from the effects of his unlawful act.

232

An act involving a younger boy setting a fire was also covered by

insurance. A ten-year-old boy set fire to a home primarily as a prank; he

233

wanted the excitement of seeing the fire trucks come. The court found that the

234

boy had no conscious intent to cause property damage. However, the dissent

235

pointed out that the minor had broken into the home and set separate fires in two

rooms by lighting papers and pictures. Although the majority did not identify

236

age as a factor in their decision, it is reasonable to infer that age indeed was a

deciding factor. If an average fifteen-year-old had set these fires as a prank,

237

it is doubtful the court would find a lack of conscious intent to cause damage.

238

In addition, the case was decided in 1977. A ten-year-old’s actions and intent

might be viewed differently today—more than twenty years later.

An earlier case yielded similar results. An eight-year-old set fire to a

neighbor’s home causing significant property damage. The child testified that

239

he started the fire to frighten the neighbor’s children because he was angry with

2000 HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 689

240. See id.

241. Id. at 401.

242. See Seaburg v. Williams, 161 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959).

243. Id. at 578.

them, but that he did not intend to burn the house. The court held the child

240

intentionally set the fire, but because of his “tender age”, he did not intend to

damage the house. Finally, an Illinois case involving a five- and one-half-year-

241

old who set a fire used the same rationale to find insurance coverage for the

act. The court stated, “Based upon the evidence of defendant’s age, capacity,

242

intelligence and experience, we conclude that he lacked the mental and moral

capacity to possess the intent to do the act complained of.”

243

Although these cases are more evenly split between including and excluding

the acts from insurance coverage, the inclusions basically fall into two categories.

The first category centers on acts which do not specifically involve setting

fires—the fire and its resultant property damage were not intended. Fires

incidental to other intentional acts, such as stealing, are covered by insurance.

The second category is age specific. Younger children, due to their age, lack

intent to cause property damage even though they commit an intentional act by

setting a fire. Fires set by older minors are, for the most part, excluded from

insurance coverage.

CONCLUSION

Through the years, courts have continued to broaden the intentional acts

exclusion and the occurrence definition in insurance policies. The result has

been to deny insurance coverage for minors’ intentional acts. In cases involving

shootings with firearms and physical assaults, almost all of the courts have found

no insurance coverage. However, courts are less certain to exclude insurance

coverage for acts involving shooting with BB guns or arson. A major reason for

distinguishing shooting with BB guns from shooting with firearms or punching

someone is the certainty of injury. A punch or a bullet is substantially certain to

cause some type of injury whereas a BB gun pellet may “sting” a person without

causing injury. When an act is not certain to cause injury, then the question of

the actor’s intent is more crucial in determining insurance coverage.

Courts are less willing to exclude acts of arson from insurance coverage.

Although a fire is almost certain to cause property damage, if not bodily injury,

courts are reluctant in some cases to exclude the act of setting a fire from

insurance coverage. The courts’ reluctance centers on one of two major factors:

the act itself or the age of the actor. When the fire is incidental to the intended

act, then the courts do not apply the intentional acts exclusion. The actor’s age

is also central to determining intent to injure. Courts have found minors under

the age of eleven do not form intent to injure where they claim to have set the fire

for reasons other than to cause property damage.

Age does not appear to be a major factor in the other types of intentional

acts. Courts infer intent or find actual intent, regardless of the minor’s age, in

690 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665

cases involving shootings with firearms, shootings with BB guns, and physical

assaults. However, the cases raised on appeal usually involve teenage insureds.

As a child ages and matures, age will become less of a factor in determining

intent, both objectively and subjectively. If projections hold true and the minor

population increases with younger children committing more crimes, it will be

interesting to see if the courts begin to cite age as a major factor in ascertaining

intent to injure.

Exceptions to finding intent to injure are fairly limited. The exceptions,

while not discussed in each intentional act category, can probably be applied to

all categories. Mental illness, self-defense, unintentional act, and uncertainty of

injury are defenses used by insureds to argue for insurance coverage. However,

these defenses have high public policy hurdles to clear before the courts will

accept them and find that insurance companies should pay for the victim’s injury.

The primary function of insurance coverage is to protect insureds from

financial responsibility incurred as a result of events beyond their control.

Insurance is not designed to protect insureds from intentional acts and expected

injuries. By finding insurance coverage for intentional acts and resulting

injuries, courts alter the function of insurance. Such a change then defeats one

of the primary public policy considerations underlying the function of insurance:

it allows the insured to escape financial responsibility for actions that she can

control. Insurance then facilitates the insured’s intentional action rather than

deterring it.

For minors, underlying public policy considerations may not be as strong.

It is doubtful that the existence of an insurance policy impacts a minor’s decision

to commit an intentional act. Financial responsibility to the victim probably does

not enter into the minor attacker’s mind. However, regardless of its impact on

an individual minor, society must deter minors, including younger children, from

intentional acts that cause bodily injury or property damage. Punishing minor

attackers through the criminal justice system is just one way to accomplish

society’s overriding goal. Another way is to exclude intentional acts from

insurance coverage and to require the minor attacker to take financial

responsibility for compensating his victim. Although this way may not send a

message to the individual minor, it does send a message to parents of minors, as

well as to society as a whole. Shootings, assaults, fires—acts where someone can

get hurt or something can get damaged—will not be condoned no matter what

age the attacker.